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INTRODUCTION
Certain modern law enforcement surveillance techniques lead to
wrongful arrests and, arguably, infringe upon an individual’s
constitutional freedom from warrantless searches.1 Indeed, such
warrantless cell phone location searches on an individual’s cell phone
location are leading to wrongful incarceration.2 For example, in
December 2018, Avondale, Arizona, police arrested Jorge Molina after
they ordered Google to turn over Molina’s cell phone location records.3
This information tied Molina’s location to an earlier crime scene.4 Molina
was eventually cleared of his charges after police found the real culprit,
but he will never be made whole from the reputational and emotional
damage.5 It is an open question today whether such warrantless location
searches are constitutional. The Supreme Court and a number of states
are currently weighing in on law enforcement’s ability to warrantlessly
track an individual’s digital location records.
In the 2018 landmark case Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme
Court decided that (1) an individual holds a legitimate expectation of
privacy in that individual’s cellular phone’s “cell-site location
information” (CSLI), and (2) warrantless law enforcement historical CSLI
searches of one week or more violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 CSLI is the information cell
phones convey to nearby cell towers, which are then used to triangulate a
person’s position.7 The Carpenter Court declined to rule whether real-time
location surveillance or historical searches of less than one week require

1. See generally Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a Dragnet for
Police,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/google-location-tracking-police.html
[https://perma.cc/PJ3W-V8GK].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Bree Burkitt, Man Says Avondale Police Used Google Data to Wrongfully Arrest
Him
in
2018
Killing,
AZ
CENTRAL
(July
31,
2019),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/southwest-valley/2019/07/31/jorge-luis-moli
na-says-avondale-police-used-google-data-wrongfully-arrest-him-murder-joe-knight/187
3878001/ [https://perma.cc/G8EC-838N].
5. See id.
6. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
7. See Cell Phone Location Tracking or CSLI: A Guide for Criminal Defense Attorneys,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/files/2017/10/30/cell_phone_location_information_one_pager_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YRH8-UU39] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
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search warrants.8 As a result, it is unknown whether current legislation
that only requires “reasonable grounds”9 to search CSLI sufficiently
protects an individual’s constitutional rights.
Legislators who enacted the outdated telecommunication laws could
not have contemplated warrantless searches of an individual’s location at
virtually every moment.10 Congress passed the Stored Communications
Act in 1986, a whopping 14 years before the first cell phone would be
equipped with GPS.11 Ever-improving technological advances and
societal reliance on cell phones made the Carpenter ruling inevitable.
Justice Sotomayor remarked that, unlike previous decades, most people
today consider their cell phone as more of an “appendage” than an
electronic device.12 Still, Carpenter’s narrow holding declined to rule on
the constitutionality of real-time CLSI searches, as well as historical
searches of less than one week.13
This Note seeks to examine Carpenter and, in doing so, best present
possible solutions to protect an individual’s real-time and historical CSLI.
In Part I, this Note discusses the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in
Carpenter v. United States, with particular emphasis on the four dissents
which imagine a different legal framework than the status quo. Part II
traces the evolution of federal telecommunications legislation and
common law doctrines regarding warrantless law enforcement searches,
and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.14 Part III outlays the current judicial split amongst lower

8. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
9. DEP’T OF JUST., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE
IN
CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS
(2002),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/practicallawyering/Week9DOJECPAExcerpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SM4L-KHPU] (“[T]he governmental entity [must] offer[] specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
10. See generally Mark Sullivan, A Brief History of GPS, PC WORLD (Aug. 9, 2012, 6:00
AM),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/2000276/a-brief-history-of-gps.html
[https://perma.cc/74UP-CQQZ].
11. See id.
12. Alan Butler, SCOTUS Justices Are Ready to Tackle Privacy Rights in the Digital
(Dec.
12,
2017,
7:00
AM),
Age,
HILL
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/362901-scotus-justices-are-ready-to-tackle-privac
y-rights-in-the-digital-age [https://perma.cc/G8M9-MFMK]; see also Amy Davidson
Sorkin, In Carpenter Case, Justice Sotomayor Tries to Picture the Smartphone Future, NEW
YORKER
(Nov.
30,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/carpenter-justice-sotomayor-tries-to-p
icture-smartphone-future [https://perma.cc/GRB4-SMEJ].
13. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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courts on how to treat real-time and historical CSLI searches
post-Carpenter, as well as an initiative in some states to protect their
citizens’ location information from warrantless searches.
In conclusion, this Note advocates for states to individually adopt
Justice Gorsuch’s property classification of CSLI, thereby providing more
protection against warrantless location searches than the federal
government does, with the intent to influence the Supreme Court to adopt
his approach eventually.
I. UNDERSTANDING CARPENTER AND EVOLVING POLICE SURVEILLANCE
LAWS
Part I provides background information regarding Carpenter and the
four dissents that accompanied Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion.
In particular, it reviews the applicable statutes and Supreme Court
decisions that have brought us to today’s Fourth Amendment crossroads.
When law enforcement employs questionable modern surveillance
methods, such as warrantless surveillance of an individual’s cell phone
location, governing law must be reviewed to determine its ongoing
relevance and possible infringement upon the individual’s
constitutionally guaranteed freedom from “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”15 Throughout this Note, it is important to keep in mind the
Supreme Court’s “sliding scale” approach to the Fourth Amendment,
which provides a different, context-based threshold for what is considered
“reasonable.”16
A. Carpenter: Phone Thief Nabbed after His Own Cell Phone’s Location
Was Warrantlessly Searched
In 2018, the Supreme Court passed down its most impactful Fourth
Amendment decision in years.17 The Court granted certiorari in Carpenter
v. United States to decide whether the Fourth Amendment protects
against warrantless cell phone location record searches — which had
never been classified as a person, paper, thing, or effect.18 This holding
calls into question whether current telecommunications legislation
sufficiently protects an individual’s CSLI from warrantless law
15. See id.
16. See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of
Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 765 (1979).
17. See generally Carpenter v. United States: Whether the Fourth Amendment Permits
the Government to Obtain Six Months of Cell Phone Location Records Without a Warrant,
PRIV.
INFO.
CTR.,
https://epic.org/amicus/location/carpenter/
ELEC.
[https://perma.cc/JH9L-HZ84] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
18. See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206.
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enforcement searches. Law enforcement may currently search this data
if they have reasonable suspicion, which is a lower standard than probable
cause that the Fourth Amendment demands.19 But in exchange,
searching CSLI allows law enforcement to identify suspects more
efficiently and take them into custody. Fourth Amendment enthusiasts
closely followed Carpenter v. United States, keenly aware that Carpenter’s
holding and extrapolated rationale could result in dramatic consequences
affecting an individual’s right to be free from warrantless location
searches.20
i. RadioShack Robbery: An Unlikely Digital Privacy Battleground
Timothy Carpenter is now the face of digital privacy. He arrived at
this position when he received a 116-year sentence after police searched
his CSLI without a warrant.21 Many, including nationally recognized law
professor Orin Kerr, have scrutinized the circumstances leading to
Carpenter’s arrest and conviction.22 His story began in April 2011, when
law enforcement investigated a string of robberies from nine different
RadioShack and T-Mobile stores across Ohio and Michigan.23 They
quickly arrested four suspects, one who confessed to the robberies and
implicated 15 accomplices.24 This informant voluntarily provided the
Federal Bureau of Investigation with a list of his co-conspirators’ cell

19. See Sean Fernandes, Supreme Court Addresses Stored Communications Act Cases,
BAR
ASS’N
(Feb.
15,
2019),
AM.
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/privacy-data-security/practi
ce/2018/supreme-court-addresses-stored-communications-act-cases/
[https://perma.cc/YE6J-PTDX].
20. See, e.g., Rebecca Kielty, Carpenter v. United States: Impacts on Privacy
NAT'L
CONSUMERS
LEAGUE
(June
2018),
Legislation,
https://www.nclnet.org/carpenter_decision [https://perma.cc/LEC5-KYFR] (“You’re
thinking, ‘And? I’m not accused of armed robbery,’ but it’s bigger than Timothy
Carpenter. The Carpenter decision affects all of us, and in essence redefines government
searches in a digital age.”).
21. See Brandi Buchman, High Court Bends for Digital Privacy in Cell-Search Case,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERV.
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.courthousenews.com/high-court-bends-for-digital-privacy-in-cell-search-cas
e/ [https://perma.cc/SGD3-8WJE].
22. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Does Carpenter Revolutionize the Law of Subpoenas?, LAWFARE
(June
26,
2018,
6:44
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-carpenter-revolutionize-law-subpoenas
[https://perma.cc/3YXN-58UZ].
23. See Rebecca Heilweil, A Guy Who Stole Phones from Radioshack Could Be the Next
(June
20,
2018,
1:10
PM),
Face
of
Digital
Privacy,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccaheilweil1/2018/06/20/a-guy-who-stole-phones-fromradioshack-could-be-the-next-face-of-digital-privacy/#4d54bed42e5f
[https://perma.cc/A6H3-799E].
24. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
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phone numbers.25 Law enforcement also uncovered a number of
additional cell phone numbers that the informant called around the time
of the robberies, but which the informant did not volunteer.26 Timothy
Carpenter’s number was among those.27
With this new information, the Government obtained court orders
pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA), compelling the
suspects’ cellular providers to turn over their location records.28 The SCA
permits law enforcement to obtain reports from cellular providers by
court order where there are “reasonable grounds” for suspicion.29
MetroPCS and Sprint (Carpenter’s wireless carriers at the time) dutifully
turned over 127 days of Carpenter’s CSLI to investigators.30 Currently,
triangulating this CSLI can pinpoint a person’s location to within five to
ten feet, and this technology is ever-improving.31 Carpenter’s CSLI
allowed the prosecution to catalog and map out exactly 12,988 of his
location points and times, which averages to about 101 data points per
day.32 This compilation placed Carpenter at the scene and time of each
robbery.33 Thereafter, Timothy Carpenter was charged with six counts of
robbery and an additional six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal
crime of violence.34 Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI evidence
against him on Fourth Amendment grounds.35 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Carpenter’s motion to
suppress the evidence, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling.36 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.37

25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2019).
29. See Fernandes, supra note 19.
30. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
31. See Cell Phone Location Tracking: A National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL) Primer, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. & SAMUELSON L., TECH., &
PUB.
POL’Y
CLINIC
(June
7,
2016),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-Tracking-Pr
imer_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV8J-HL4B].
32. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable” searches
and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206.
37. See id. at 2213.
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ii. Modern Technology “[I]s an Open Box. We Know Not Where We Go”38
In another 5–4 ruling during this politically-charged era,39 the Supreme
Court held that law enforcement’s CSLI collection constituted a Fourth
Amendment “search,” thus requiring a warrant secured by probable
cause. 40 The Carpenter Court held that the Government’s reasonable
grounds of suspicion court order was insufficient to conduct a CSLI
search.41 The Court purposely ruled narrowly, however, careful not to
disturb prior Supreme Court decisions regarding law enforcement
surveillance and the Fourth Amendment.42 The Court also declined to
address modern surveillance tactics, such as security cameras.43 As a
result, lower courts remain split on whether particular warrantless police
searches are “reasonable,” especially now that individuals can be tracked
with almost pinpoint precision at all times.44 And this technology is only
improving and getting more accurate.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote Carpenter’s majority opinion,45 which was
followed by four separate dissents from the other conservative Justices.
The Chief Justice held that law enforcement’s access to Carpenter’s CSLI
indeed constituted a Fourth Amendment search because it violated
Carpenter’s “legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his
physical movements.”46 In other words, law enforcement’s warrantless
search of Carpenter’s CSLI for seven days violated his “reasonable
expectation of privacy” that the Fourth Amendment guarantees.47 The
Court equated a CSLI search to attaching an ankle monitor to the phone’s

38. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018)
(No.
16-402),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-402_3f14.
pdf [https://perma.cc/96FC-JEU3].
39. Chief Justice Roberts sided with the four liberal-leaning Justices to form a
majority. See Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter Decision, LAWFARE
(June
22,
2018,
1:18
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-supreme-courts-carpenter-decision
[https://perma.cc/KQ4L-AXKC].
40. See Kate Fazzini, Supreme Court Ruling Requiring Warrant for Cellphone Searches
Could Lead to a Flood of Lawsuits, CNBC (June 25, 2020, 7:18 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/privacy-scotus-cell-data-carpenter-v-usa.html
[https://perma.cc/L863-NFCL].
41. See id.
42. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220–21.
43. See id.
44. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2012).
45. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2211.
46. Id. at 2217.
47. See Kerr, supra note 22.

2020]

DOES CARPENTER PUT A NAIL IN

1483

user.48 The analogy here is that since both a cell phone and ankle monitor
are on the person at all times, a search is inherently intrusive and requires
a warrant. However, the Court was careful to not “embarrass the future”
by creating a rule that would quickly become obsolete as technology
advanced.49 It declined to provide “judicial answers [regarding CSLI]
which at best can deal only in a truncated way with problems sufficiently
difficult even for legislative statesmanship.”50 For this reason, the Court
held that a CSLI search of seven days or more constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.51
iii. This CSLI Investigation Constituted a Search, but What about Others?
Due to Carpenter’s narrow holding, it is only a matter of time before
law enforcement surveillance technology reaches the Supreme Court
again.52 Therefore, an analysis of Carpenter’s separate dissents is
necessary to consider a more permanent solution. Dissents and
concurrences sometimes serve as persuasive authority in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and may guide future majority opinions.53
Resolving future issues with a reasoned and well-informed holding will
require much reconciliation of competing interests, like out-of-date
telecommunications statutes and different Supreme Court Justices’
approaches. Otherwise, the next Supreme Court case on law enforcement
surveillance risks becoming obsolete over time, over-inclusive,
under-inclusive, or even an infringement upon an individual’s freedom
from “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Indeed, the Court and
legislature’s inertia to act definitively results in law enforcement, with
little checks on its discretion, to warrantlessly track individuals.
Although Carpenter recognizes these risks and therefore limits its
applicability, previously unforeseeable instances are now foreseeable. Yet
issues surrounding real-time and historical CSLI searches of less than
seven days are currently left unresolved because it remains unclear the
extent to which law enforcement can constitutionally surveil an

48. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
49. See id. at 2220.
50. Nw. Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944).
51. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
52. See Vanessa Blum, What’s Next for Digital Privacy? New Clashes over the Fourth
(Mar.
7,
2019,
4:36
PM),
Amendment,
LAW.COM
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/03/07/whats-next-for-digital-privacy-new-clashes
-over-the-fourth-amendment/?slreturn=20200505113737
[https://perma.cc/3EZM-F6XE].
53. See Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, How the Dissent Becomes the Majority: Using
Federalism to Transform Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, 59 DUKE L.J. 183, 183
(2009).
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individual’s CSLI. For this reason, a definitive answer to the
constitutionality of warrantless CSLI searches with clear demarcations of
law enforcement’s warrantless search capabilities, along with the
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless,
intrusive surveillance, must be provided.
1. Justice Kennedy (Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito): Treat CSLI as
a Business Record
Justice Kennedy advocated for treating warrantlessly obtained CSLI
like other types of business records, such as bank or accounting records.54
This approach defers to the “Third Party Doctrine,” which states that
searching location records that are “possessed, owned, and controlled” by
service providers does not infringe upon an individual’s right from
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. 55 Two cases before
the Supreme Court, United States v. Miller56 and Smith v. Maryland,57 set
forth this doctrine, which states that voluntarily sharing information
with third parties negates any reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information.58 Specifically, Miller held that people have no Fourth
Amendment privacy rights in financial records that their bank stores,
whereas Smith permitted a warrantless search where police utilized a pen
register to monitor a suspect’s outgoing call data.59
Still, Justice Kennedy appreciated the possibility that advanced
surveillance capabilities may infringe on an individual’s Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.60
Regarding this, he remarked that “property norms and expectations of
privacy . . . [are] difficult to determine during periods of rapid
technological change. In those instances, and where the governing legal
standard is one of reasonableness, it is wise to defer to legislative
54. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
55. See id.; infra Section I.B.ii. The Third Party Doctrine holds that voluntarily
sharing information with third parties negates any reasonable expectation of privacy in
that information. This effectively negates any right in the individual’s own CSLI once the
wireless carrier receives it. See infra Section I.B.ii.
56. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
57. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
58. See Heilweil, supra note 23.
59. See John Villasenor, What You Need to Know About the Third Party Doctrine,
(Dec.
10,
2013),
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what-you-need-to-know-about
-the-third-party-doctrine/282721/ [https://perma.cc/3DCK-GFHX]. A pen register is a
device a telephone company installs to record the phone numbers an individual dials. See
Pen Register, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/pen_register
[https://perma.cc/NDQ4-RKSP] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
60. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2233 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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judgments like . . . the Stored Communications Act.”61 This approach
gives deference to the legislature, which is democratically accountable
and therefore better situated to gauge what society would deem as a
“reasonable” warrantless search than a majority of unelected Supreme
Court Justices.
2. Justice Thomas: The Fourth Amendment’s Text Does Not Protect CSLI
Justice Thomas’s main point of objection with the Carpenter majority
opinion was that the Supreme Court implemented the “reasonable
expectation of privacy test” developed in the 1967 opinion Katz v. United
States.62 Justice Thomas believed that the Katz test from Justice John
Marshall Harlan’s concurrence lacked grounding in the Fourth
Amendment’s text and original meaning.63 To illustrate this point,
Justice Thomas noted how the word “privacy” is absent from the Fourth
Amendment, as well as the Framers’ original intent after a historical
review. 64 Justice Thomas argued that these two points show that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect privacy.65 He stated that “[b]y
defining ‘search’ to mean ‘any violation of a reasonable expectation of
privacy,’ the Katz test misconstrues virtually every one of [the Fourth
Amendment’s] words.”66 Justice Thomas then reviewed the dictionary
meaning of “search” from an edition dating back to 1828 to understand
the Framers’ actual intent when drafting the Fourth Amendment.67 He
urged the Court to dismiss the Katz privacy test altogether.68
Justice Thomas also disagreed with Carpenter’s attempt to categorize
his CSLI as a Fourth Amendment “paper” to invoke a property right in
his location.69 Justice Thomas explained that an individual has never
held a property right in cell-site records “under the law of any jurisdiction
at any point in American history.”70

61. Id.
62. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 2238.
65. See id.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See id. At the time, the ordinary meaning of “search” was “[t]o look over or
through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to
search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.” Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001)).
68. See id. at 2244.
69. See id. at 2242.
70. Id.
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3. Justice Alito (Joined by Justice Thomas): The Fourth Amendment’s
Intent Does Not Protect CSLI
Justice Alito similarly criticized the inconsistency between “property”
that the Fourth Amendment should protect — as determined by
analyzing the ordinary meaning of the Amendment’s text — and Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion.71 Justice Alito emphasized the Amendment’s
plain meaning and the Framers’ intent should be dispositive in concluding
the Constitution does not protect against warrantless CSLI searches.72 He
then quoted Justice Hugo Black’s dissent in Katz: “The Fourth
Amendment was aimed directly at the abhorred practice of breaking in,
ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing people’s
personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates.”73 In other
words, as originally understood by the Framers, “the Fourth Amendment
would not have applied at all to the methods that law-enforcement
officials use to obtain documents” to include warrantless CSLI searches.74
Justice Alito also emphasized that the Government followed the
well-established Third Party Doctrine to receive Carpenter’s CSLI.75
However, now that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional this law
enforcement search, all searches longer than one week are similarly
rendered unconstitutional.76 It remains to be seen whether searches of
lesser duration are unconstitutional, as the Supreme Court “has offered
no meaningful limiting principle, and none is apparent”77 — suggesting
that Justice Alito is apprehensive Carpenter will impede on current law
enforcement policies, which allow searches under reasonable grounds
instead of probable cause.78
4. Justice Gorsuch: Instill an Individual Property Right in CSLI
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent urges future defendants to make a
property-based argument to protect their CSLI, which the Supreme Court

71. See id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 2250.
73. See id. at 2251 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
74. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Holds That Police Will Generally Need a
Warrant for Sustained Cellphone Location Information (Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (June 22,
2018,
6:01
PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-holds-that-police-will-gener
ally-need-a-warrant-for-cellphone-location-information/ [https://perma.cc/95QL-6HDN].
75. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 2266–67 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting).
78. See id.
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may later classify as “person, house, paper, and effect” under the Fourth
Amendment.79 Of course, this is a novel idea shown by Justice Thomas’s
and Justice Alito’s respective dissents, which each argue that the Fourth
Amendment explicitly does not protect CSLI from warrantless searches.80
Nonetheless, the idea of endowing Fourth Amendment protection in new
technology is consistent with Justice Gorsuch’s previous Tenth Circuit
opinions.81
Justice Gorsuch argued that an individual’s CSLI might “qualify as his
papers or effects under existing law”82 under the Fourth Amendment for
two reasons: (1) the statutory Privacy of Customer Information Act
provides an individual CSLI property right, and (2) technology is
increasingly used for storing information in the modern era, much like a
“paper” was during the eighteenth century, when the Fourth Amendment
was written.83
iv. Justice Gorsuch’s Originalist Argument Regarding Property Rights in
CSLI
Justice Gorsuch argued that the Fourth Amendment protects against
warrantless law enforcement searches of an individual’s CSLI. Although
previous Supreme Court terms and some sitting Justices today hesitate to
adapt the Fourth Amendment to modern surveillance technology, Justice
Gorsuch shows no such hesitation.84 Justice Gorsuch uses the following
statutory and contextual arguments to bolster his claim.

79. See id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 2237–44, 2264; supra Sections I.A.iii.b–c.
81. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that
opening an email file constituted a Fourth Amendment “search”).
82. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 2267–68, 2272 (“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’ True to those words and their original understanding, the traditional approach
asked if a house, paper or effect was yours under law. No more was needed to trigger the
Fourth Amendment. Though now often lost in Katz’s shadow, this traditional
understanding persists. . . . Yes, the telephone carrier holds the information. But 47 U.S.C.
§ 222 designates a customer's cell-site location information as ‘customer proprietary
network information’ (CPNI), § 222(h)(1)(A), and gives customers certain rights to control
use of and access to CPNI about themselves.’”).
84. See Jim Harper, Common-Law Originalism in Tech Policy, Too, AM. ENTER. INST.
(Jan.
28,
2020),
https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/common-law-originalism-in-tech-policytoo/ [https://perma.cc/8FKL-DAHK].

1488

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

1. Privacy of Customer Information Act
Justice Gorsuch’s statutory argument to vest a property right in CSLI
comes from Congress. The Privacy of Customer Information Act requires
that (1) federal statutes regard CSLI as “customer proprietary network
information,”85 (2) carriers are generally forbidden from using CSLI
without the customer’s consent, (3) carriers must disclose CSLI upon the
customer’s consent, and (4) Congress provide individuals with a cause of
action for claims brought against non-compliant carriers.86 These
interests signal a personal interest in the individual’s own CSLI,
culminating in a Fourth Amendment property right.87 Therefore, Justice
Gorsuch posited, “[p]lainly, customers have substantial legal interests in
this information, including at least some right to include, exclude, and
control its use. Those interests might even rise to the level of a property
right.”88 Unfortunately, Timothy Carpenter made a fatal error in not
raising or preserving this statutory defense in Carpenter.89 Lower courts
and law enforcement must now wait for Supreme Court guidance about
the constitutionality of other warrantless CSLI searches because
“[Carpenter] forfeited Fourth Amendment arguments based on positive
law by failing to preserve them.”90
2. Modern Technology Has Fundamentally Changed How America Stores
Information
Today, as opposed to 1791 or even 20 years ago, we rely upon
technology to conduct almost everything in our lives, from important
business to mundane tasks. The overwhelming majority of people in the
United States rely on their cell phones to navigate, store confidential
medical and financial information, and even conceal their most personal
and intimate photos and communications.91 Due to this foundational

85. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012) (emphasis added).
86. See id.
87. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See Kielty, supra note 20 (“Think of your relationship with your cell phone.
According to Pew, 95 percent of Americans now own one. The same study found that for
one in five of us, our smartphone is our sole source of Internet service. We carry them to
work, to school, to our homes, and to meet up with friends. They go with us to our
meetings, appointments, and vacations. They are a key vector through which we’re
understood. Part of that is an unprecedented ability to locate us. When 95 percent of us
are moving and communicating with our phones, and when 20 percent of us are using
them as our only personal Internet connection, government access to when and where we
use cell phones becomes an inroad to very intimate surveillance.”).
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societal change, Justice Gorsuch argued that the Fourth Amendment
should protect personal information residing in cellular devices like it does
for constitutionally-protected information in one’s nightstand. 92 He
noted how documents which, “in other eras, we would have locked safely
in a desk drawer or destroyed — now reside on third party servers.”93
According to Justice Gorsuch, because they contain the same
information, “virtual” documents that constitute “papers” deserve
Fourth Amendment protection.
v. Justice Gorsuch’s Case against the Third Party Doctrine
Under the Third Party Doctrine, individuals lose any property interest
in cellular information — if they ever had one — once the signal reaches
their wireless carrier.94 The Supreme Court held that individuals do not
have a legitimate “expectation of privacy” in such information because
they volunteered the information to their service provider.95 As a result,
the Fourth Amendment does not protect against warrantless searches of
CSLI, banking records, and other business records that a third party
holds.96 However, Carpenter failed to preserve the argument that CSLI
may be categorized as “property” under the Fourth Amendment.97 If he
had employed that defense, the Supreme Court could very well find that
CSLI deserves Fourth Amendment protection, rendering all warrantless
CSLI searches unconstitutional. This is because applying the Third Party
Doctrine’s lower standard to searches that demand probable cause
warrants would insufficiently protect the individual from unreasonable
warrantless searches.
Justice Gorsuch made the property argument that “[e]ntrusting your
[property] to others is a bailment,”98 defined as the “delivery of personal
property by one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the
property for a certain purpose.”99 Under a property law lens, an

92. See id. at 2271. “[T]his Court has recognized that using that technology to look
inside a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ of that ‘home’ no less than a
physical inspection might.” Id.
93. Id. at 2262.
94. See infra Section I.B.
95. See infra Section I.B.ii.
96. See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that bank
records are not protected by the Fourth Amendment); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that law enforcements’ use of a pen register is not a “search”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
97. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2268.
99. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014)).
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individual would not lose interest in their CSLI after it is transmitted to
their cellular provider. “The constitutional guaranty of the right of the
people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever
they may be.”100 Therefore, any CSLI inspection would possibly require a
probable cause warrant to comport with the Fourth Amendment.
B. Applicable Statutes and Common Law Concerning Warrantless Police
Surveillance
Federal statutes and Supreme Court decisions primarily govern the
intersection of modern law enforcement surveillance techniques and the
Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Undoubtedly, some of our telecommunication laws were drafted
without CSLI in mind. Yet the Supreme Court must apply these laws to
modern surveillance situations where technology has evolved so
drastically that searches of invasive location searches, including inside of
“purses, pockets, briefcases, and backpacks,” are possible without
contact.101 The following cases and statutes help explain the Supreme
Court’s and Congress’ understanding of societal expectations regarding
when warrantless searches are reasonable.
i. Katz v. United States
Katz v. United States established a “balancing test” to decide whether
an individual’s right to privacy is protected in particular situations.102
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a “bugged”
phone booth infringed upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.103 This case is salient
today because “[t]he long arm of Katz reaches into recent debates over
mass data collection and GPS tracking. Indeed, in an age of increasing
digital technology, the principle that the Fourth Amendment ‘protects
people, not places’ is more consequential than ever.”104

100. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (emphasis added).
101. Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition
of the Government’s Request for Review at 18, in re United States for an Order Directing
Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585
(2007) (No. 2:07-MJ-00524).
102. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
103. See id.
104. Nicandro Iannacci, Katz v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Adapts to New
CONST.
CTR.
(Dec.
18,
2018),
Technology,
NAT’L
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/katz-v-united-states-the-fourth-amendment-adapts-t
o-new-technology [https://perma.cc/68NY-BUTZ].
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In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies
to oral statements in the same way that it applies to tangible objects.105
Regarding privacy, the Court stated: “What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”106
Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence set forth the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test now used to determine whether warrantless
law enforcement surveillance constitutes a “search” and thus requires a
probable cause warrant.107 One possible drawback of this test is that it
lacks bright-line rules for the judiciary to apply.108 Because of this
discretion, the reasonable expectation of privacy test “has haunted
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence all these decades, partly because no
one is entirely sure what it means in different fact situations raised by
different cases.”109 This test does, however, respond to “[l]egitimation of
expectations of privacy [that] by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society.”110 For example, when the sliding scale approach is applied to
the home,111 owners and tenants “almost always” have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.112 On the other hand, visitor rights are more
uncertain because “it’s not enough to simply happen to be somewhere in
order to contest a search, but [one does not] have to have a strict property
interest in the place either.”113 The fact that different individuals can
have different expectations of privacy in the same area results in much
judicial discretion when it comes to reasonable expectations of privacy.
105. See id.
106. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
107. See id. at 361.
108. See Andrew Crocker, The Supreme Court Says Your Expectation of Privacy Probably
Shouldn’t Depend on Fine Print, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 15, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/supreme-court-says-your-expectation-privacy-pro
bably-shouldnt-depend-fine-print [https://perma.cc/Q6KV-4EES].
109. Mike Godwin, What’s Next for the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, SLATE (June
27,
2018,
3:28
PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/06/after-the-supreme-courts-carpenter-ruling-where-is
-the-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-heading.html [https://perma.cc/Q825-C5E5].
110. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
111. See Crocker, supra note 108. See generally, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (invalidating a Texas statute that made it a crime for same-sex persons to engage
in sexual conduct. Such laws were unconstitutional as applied to adults in the privacy of
their homes).
112. See Crocker, supra note 108 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)).
113. Id.; see also Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 93 (1990) (holding that overnight
guests can contest a police search).
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This discretion can lead to good-faith differences in what modern
warrantless surveillance searches are reasonable.
ii. Third Party Doctrine
The Third Party Doctrine permits law enforcement to warrantlessly
collect an individual’s information from third party businesses, like
cellular providers and banks.114 The Supreme Court established the
doctrine through a duo of 1970s cases,115 and the Government in Carpenter
relied on this doctrine to justify Carpenter’s warrantless CSLI search.116
This doctrine is now applied to modern forms of information to surveil
other third party records.117 This is true notwithstanding our current
technological revolution, the likes of which have not been seen since
perhaps when Gutenberg invented the printing press.118 As a result, a
number of modern law enforcement surveillance tactics have come under
scrutiny as law enforcement are now able to access vast quantities of data,
which the legislature simply could not foresee when adopting the Stored
Communications Act.119 “[D]igitization and technological advances
[have] increasingly placed the [Third Party] doctrine under pressure, as
an increasing amount of potentially revealing information is now in the
hands of third parties.”120 This suggests that reasonable societal
expectations of privacy are changing, which is why some have called the

114. See Matthew Feeney, Surveillance Tech Still a Concern After Carpenter, CATO INST.
(June
25,
2018,
12:44
PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/surveillance-tech-still-concern-despite-carpenter
[https://perma.cc/68HP-VTUM].
115. The two cases establishing the Third Part Doctrine, United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), hold that voluntarily sharing
information with third parties negates any reasonable expectation of privacy in such
information. See Heilweil, supra note 23.
116. See Jim Garland & Alexander Berengaut, Supreme Court’s Carpenter Decision
Requires Warrant for Cell Phone Location Data, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY (June 22,
2018),
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/supreme-courts-carpenter-decision-requires
-warrant-for-cell-phone-location-data/ [https://perma.cc/7T2M-QHX8].
117. See Christopher C. Fonzone et al., Carpenter and Everything After: The Supreme
Court Nudges the Fourth Amendment into the Information Age, 58 INFRASTRUCTURE 3, 3
(2019).
118. See Jeremiah Dittmar, Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact
(Feb.
11,
2011),
of
the
Printing
Press,
VOXEU
https://voxeu.org/article/information-technology-and-economic-change-impact-printingpress [https://perma.cc/DQW5-7TCL] (“The movable type printing press was the great
revolution in Renaissance information technology and arguably provides the closest
historical parallel to the emergence of the internet . . . .”).
119. See Fonzone et al., supra note 117, at 4–5.
120. Id. at 3.

2020]

DOES CARPENTER PUT A NAIL IN

1493

Third Party Doctrine, in the context of law enforcement’s vastly
improved surveillance capabilities, into question.121
In Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit held on appeal that Timothy Carpenter
did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his physical
location as determined by CSLI.122 The Supreme Court, however,
overturned the circuit court.123 The Supreme Court explicitly ruled
narrowly, and the only bright-line rule established was that collecting
seven days or more of historical CSLI requires a warrant.124 This holding
creates a compliance issue because lower courts must decide whether the
Third Party Doctrine applies to real-time CSLI searches and CSLI
searches of less than seven days.
iii. Stored Communications Act of 1986
Congress passed the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA) to
regulate the exponential growth of modern technology (at this time,
e-mail was becoming prominent).125 The SCA provides procedural steps
the government must take to obtain, inter alia, CSLI from third-party
service providers like Verizon or T-Mobile.126 The SCA permits the
government to compel disclosure of an individual’s telecommunication
records when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the prosecution presents to
the court “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the records sought are (2) relevant and material
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”127 When both prongs are met, a
judge may issue a “Section 2703(d) Order”128 that law enforcement uses
to compel service providers to turn over stored communications relating
to a suspect.129

121. See Kerr, supra note 22.
122. See Feeney, supra note 114.
123. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
124. See id. at 2217 n.3.
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
126. See Mariam Morshedi, The Stored Communications Act of 1986, SUBSCRIPT L. (Jan.
29,
2018),
https://www.subscriptlaw.com/blog/stored-communications-act-origins
[https://perma.cc/V3FS-5G4S].
127. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting § 2703(d)).
128. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 101, at 14.
129. See Sabrina McCubbin, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Carpenter v. United
(June
22,
2018,
2:05
PM),
States,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-supreme-court-rules-carpenter-v-united-states
[https://perma.cc/93FV-AMD4].
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iv. The SCA’s “Reasonable Grounds” of Suspicion Standard
Under the SCA, the standard the judiciary applies is “considerably
lower than the probable cause required for a typical warrant.”130 In
Carpenter, the Government met the reasonable grounds standard by
presenting testimony from an informant that identified several
accomplices’ cell phone numbers.131 With that, law enforcement received
judicial authorization to compel Carpenter’s cell service providers to turn
over his location information.132 The prosecution received 12,898 of
Carpenter’s location points over 127 days, which averages to around 101
data points per day.133
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts declared that “an individual
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI,” regardless of whether
government surveillance or provider data collection created those
records.134 Therefore the above CSLI search required a probable cause
warrant, which the police did not obtain. As a result, the Court
unequivocally held that the warrantless law enforcement search infringed
upon Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment rights, even though law
enforcement satisfied the SCA’s two-part test and received judicial
authorization.135 Law enforcement simply failed to meet the more
protective “probable cause” standard the Fourth Amendment requires.136
The Carpenter Court held the Government needs a probable cause
warrant for historical CSLI searches of one week or more.137 This negates
the SCA’s two-part test, at least as it pertains to longer historical CSLI
searches.138 “Reasonable” societal expectations about warrantless
searches superseded the SCA for this type of search once the Fourth
Amendment was implicated.139
v. United States v. Jones
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court reaffirmed precedent from the 2012
police surveillance case United States v. Jones — at issue was whether

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 2217.
See id. at 2221.
See id. (“[T]he Government’s obligation is a familiar one — get a warrant.”).
See id.
See supra Section I.B.iii.
See Fernandes, supra note 19.
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warrantless law enforcement surveillance infringed upon an individual’s
Fourth Amendment protections.140 The Court ultimately held that
“individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of
their physical movements.”141
In Jones, law enforcement attached a GPS tracker to a suspect’s vehicle
for one month without following the precise instructions set forth in the
warrant.142 In 28 days, they collected over 2,000 pages of Jones’s location
data.143 With such vast access to Jones’s location, investigators learned
all of his movements and intimate aspects of his life.144 Not unlike
finance’s “mosaic theory,” law enforcement was able to construct a
comprehensive illustration of Jones’s habits by analyzing the aggregated
data from the locations he visited.145 The Government contended this
action was permissible for two reasons: (1) there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy on public roads; and (2) the Fourth Amendment
only protects against trespass upon personal property.146
The Justices met the Government’s argument against requiring a
warrant for GPS — stating law enforcement could have followed Jones
around on the public thoroughfares without a warrant — with
criticism.147 During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts asked the
Government whether it believed that “there would also not be a search if
[it] put a GPS device on all of [the Justices’] cars [and] monitored [their]
movements for a month?”148 Similarly, Justice Breyer quipped that if the
Government won, “there is nothing to prevent the police or the
government from monitoring 24 hours a day the public movement of
every citizen of the United States.”149 The search in Jones failed to
comport with societal notions regarding reasonableness and the Fourth
Amendment.

140. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
141. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
142. See id. at 2215.
143. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
144. See id. at 416.
145. See Ashley Jacques, The Mosaic Theory, Riley, and the Legacy of Jones, INFO. L.
INST.:
BLOG
(Mar.
12,
2015,
4:38
PM),
https://blogs.law.nyu.edu/privacyresearchgroup/2015/03/the-mosaic-theory-riley-and-th
e-legacy-of-jones/ [https://perma.cc/5H58-3YGC]; see also Christian Bennardo, Note, The
Fourth Amendment, CSLI Tracking, and the Mosaic Theory, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2385
(2017).
146. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406.
147. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(No. 10-1259).
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id. at 13.

1496

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

The Jones Court unanimously held that law enforcement conducted a
Fourth Amendment search by applying a GPS tracker onto a suspect’s
car without following the exact procedures set forth in the probable cause
warrant.150 However, the Justices disagreed on why this particular law
surveillance is a “search,” an issue also in Carpenter.151 Did surveillance
become a search because of the physical invasion of the vehicle, as Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Sotomayor, and Thomas
believed?152 Or perhaps the search occurred because Jones’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy” was violated under Katz, as Justices Alito,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan found.153
Jones is known partly for Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, which
proposed that a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs anywhere the
government encroaches upon reasonable societal expectations of
“privacy,” not only during trespass onto property.154 In response to
Justice Alito’s concurrence about physical property intrusion, she stated
that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not — and indeed, in the main, simply could not — secretly
monitor and catalog every single movement of an individual’s car for a
very long period.”155 The Carpenter majority later emphasized this
purview.156 The struggle to delineate between reasonable warrantless
searches and those requiring probable cause continues a trend of Supreme
Court jurisprudence dating back to at least Katz in 1967.157
vi. Riley v. California
Prior to Carpenter, the Supreme Court’s most recent examination of the
intersection of the Fourth Amendment and law enforcement surveillance
was in 2014 in Riley v. California.158 David Leon Riley brought a motion
to suppress evidence after law enforcement warrantlessly searched his
smartphone pursuant to his arrest.159 The fruits from this search were

150. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
151. See Peter C. Swire & William O’Neill, A Reasonableness Approach to Searches After
the Jones GPS Tracking Case, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (2012),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox-a-reasonableness-approach-t
o-searches-after-the-jones-gps-tracking-case/ [https://perma.cc/RNX3-PH38].
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
156. See Fernandes, supra note 19.
157. See supra Section I.B.i.
158. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
159. See id. at 379.
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later used against him in court.160 Riley is significant because it set a
bright-line rule that the Supreme Court will protect digital information
stored within cell phones. The Court unanimously held that law
enforcement generally needs a warrant to search a cell phone’s digital
contents, even where the search occurs during an otherwise lawful
arrest.161 The Court also held that when the Fourth Amendment is
invoked, law enforcement must always procure a probable cause
warrant.162
Chief Justice Roberts compared the Government’s contention that a
cell phone search is “materially indistinguishable” from tangible property
searches to “saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable
from a flight to the moon . . . . Modern cell phones, as a category,
implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of
a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”163 The Chief Justice provided the
same instructions that were later repeated in Carpenter: “Our answer to
the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple — get a warrant.”164 The Riley
Court emphasized the overarching privacy concerns of a warrantless law
enforcement cell phone search.165 Searching CSLI often reveals the most
intimate details of a person’s life, such as visits to medical clinics and trips
to the liquor store.166
II. DAZED AND CONFUSED: HOW STATES AND LOWER COURTS ARE
TREATING CSLI POST-CARPENTER
Section II.A discusses instances where state legislatures and lower
courts have extended Carpenter to cover various warrantless law
enforcement CSLI searches. Section II.B considers courts that have
either denied extending Carpenter or ruled without reaching the question
of warrantless real-time and shorter duration CSLI searches.
The Carpenter Supreme Court “decline[d] to say whether there is any
sufficiently limited period of time ‘for which the Government may obtain
160. See id. at 379–80
161. See id. at 403.
162. See Chaz Arnett, Carpenter and the Future of the Surveillance State, JURIST (July
17,
2019,
7:56
AM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2018/07/chaz-arnett-surveillance-carpenter/
[https://perma.cc/E3JV-UPHC].
163. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
164. Id. at 403; see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“Before
compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, the Government’s obligation
is a familiar one — get a warrant.”).
165. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.
166. See Arnett, supra note 162.
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an individual’s historical [CSLI] free from Fourth Amendment
scrutiny.’”167 The Court was worried about setting a clear rule that, over
time, could seem obsolete. If “access to seven days’ worth of information
does trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny,” Gorsuch questioned, “[w]hy
seven days instead of ten or three or one?”168 Bright lines are oftentimes
criticized as arbitrary. Indeed, the rule established in Carpenter is already
causing confusion amongst lower courts.169 Justice Gorsuch wrote that
“[a]ll we know [from Carpenter] is that historical cell-site location
information (for seven days, anyway) escapes Smith and Miller’s shorn
grasp, while a lifetime of bank or phone records does not. As to any other
kind of information, lower courts will have to stay tuned.”170 The next
Section illustrates how courts treat CSLI searches differently, an issue
which Justice Gorsuch forewarned us about.
A. Legislatures and Courts Are Extending Carpenter
The following state supreme court and lower federal court decisions
find that law enforcement CSLI searches require a probable cause warrant
post-Carpenter. This movement continues a trend Justice William J.
Brennan recognized over 40 years ago — that “more and more state
courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of
the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more
protection than the federal provisions.”171 Justice Brennan argued that
federalism “must necessarily be furthered significantly when state courts
thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the struggle to protect
the people of our nation from governmental intrusions on their
freedoms.”172 Social movements can utilize federalism to provide even
greater protection for individuals than the Constitution, which only
provides a floor of minimum protections that states may build upon.
While post-Carpenter, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to
search one week or more of historical CSLI, the complication of cases
below demonstrates how states are using federalism to similarly protect
real-time CSLI and historical CSLI of less than one week.
167. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S.
Ct. at 2217 n.3).
168. NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 159–60 (2019).
169. Cf. id. at 159–61 (explaining that confusion could arise from obligating lower
courts to use “two amorphous balancing tests, a series of weighty and incommensurable
principles to consider in them, and a few illustrative examples that seem little more than
the product of judicial intuition”).
170. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
171. William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
172. Id. at 503.
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i. Supreme Court of Connecticut
In Connecticut v. Brown, the Supreme Court of Connecticut originally
stayed defendant Terrance Brown’s appeal pending the Supreme Court’s
Carpenter decision.173 The facts in Brown concerned law enforcement’s
real-time CSLI search during an ATM theft investigation.174 Law
enforcement acted pursuant to three ex parte orders.175 They first
compelled the suspect’s cellular carrier, T-Mobile, to disclose three
months of historical telephone records.176 The other two ex parte orders
were prospective, or real time, and required T-Mobile to “ping” the
suspect’s cell phone every ten minutes during predetermined times when
future thefts were likely to occur.177 Law enforcement determined that
Brown’s location matched the general time and location of multiple
burglaries after these cell phone pings.178 During trial, Brown moved to
suppress the location evidence that law enforcement discovered after
searching his historical and real-time CSLI.179
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that these ex parte orders,
which were granted based on a “reasonable and articulable suspicion”
rather than “probable cause,” violated Brown’s Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.180 The court
expanded on Carpenter by declaring that “the prospective CSLI yielded
from the real time tracking of the defendant’s cell phone — implicates
important privacy interests that are traditionally the type protected by
the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”181 The court treated real-time and historic
CSLI similarly after failing to find a material difference between the
legitimate privacy interests of historical CSLI, which the Carpenter Court
held is protected by the Fourth Amendment, and real-time location
monitoring.182 “A person does not surrender all [F]ourth [A]mendment
protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, what
[one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”183 Brown is important because it
makes a bright-line ruling about real-time CSLI searches. “It is one of

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Connecticut v. Brown, 202 A.3d 1003, 1006 (Conn. 2019).
See id. at 1007.
See id. at 1008.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1008–09.
See id. at 1009.
See id. at 1006–07.
Id. at 1017.
See id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”184 Rights
not reserved for the federal government belong to the states pursuant to
the Tenth Amendment.185 This approach works best for experimenting
with novel solutions to complicated issues.186 Connecticut’s protection of
real-time CSLI provides a fitting example of a “states as laboratories”
approach.187 If Connecticut’s citizens value this common law protection
from warrantless location searches, it may become a model for other states
and lower courts.
ii. Supreme Court of Massachusetts
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts extended Carpenter’s probable
cause warrant requirement to real-time CSLI.188 In Commonwealth v.
Almonor,189 law enforcement warrantlessly “pinged” a murder suspect’s
cell phone in real time and discovered that he was inside of his
ex-girlfriend’s home, where he was quickly arrested.190 The Government
argued against requiring a probable cause search warrant because “they
don’t collect the content of phone calls and text messages but rather
operate like pen-registers and trap-and-traces, collecting the equivalent

184. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
185. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
186. Bradley A. Blakeman, States Are the Laboratories of Democracy, HILL (May 7, 2020,
7:30
AM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/496524-states-are-the-laboratories-of-democracy
[https://perma.cc/Z46H-SL5J].
187. See Edmund Andrews, Steven Callander: How to Make States “Laboratories of
Democracy,”
STAN.
BUS.
(May
19,
2015),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/steven-callander-how-make-states-laboratories-de
mocracy [https://perma.cc/34S3-P43G].
188. See Kade Crockford, Mass. High Court Requires Warrants for Stingray, GPS Phone
(Apr.
23,
2019),
Surveillance,
ACLU
MASS.
https://www.aclum.org/en/publications/mass-high-court-requires-warrants-stingray-gpsphone-surveillance [https://perma.cc/5HBH-XJNW].
189. 120 N.E.3d 1183 (Mass. 2019).
190. See Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1188; Jennifer Lynch, Massachusetts Court Blocks
Warrantless Access to Real-Time Cell Phone Location Data, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/massachusetts-court-blocks-warrantless-access-re
al-time-cell-phone-location-data [https://perma.cc/GU3C-256U]; see also U.S. Const.
amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
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of header information.”191 The court disagreed, holding that this search
infringed upon the individual’s protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures, even more so than the warrantless search of Carpenter.192
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled according to Article 14 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which states, “[e]very subject has a
right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”193 Massachusetts’
high court held that “society’s [reasonable] expectation has been that law
enforcement could not secretly and instantly identify a person’s real-time
physical location at will.”194 The court considered the reasonableness of
this search and found that “[a]llowing law enforcement to immediately
locate an individual whose whereabouts were previously unknown by
compelling that individual’s cell phone to reveal its location contravenes
that expectation.”195
The court’s holding illustrates that both
Massachusetts’s Article 14 and “the longstanding protections of the
Fourth Amendment apply with undiminished force to cell phone location
records.”196 Massachusetts law now states that “[a] warrant is required
to obtain a suspect’s historical cell phone location information. An ‘order
issued under § 2703(d) of the [Stored Communications] Act, [18 U.S.C. §
2703(d)] is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site
records.’”197 This case and Massachusetts’ legislative acts illustrate how
states can use their constitutions to protect their citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures beyond the federal minimum.198

191. Kim Zetter, Florida Cops’ Secret Weapon: Warrantless Cellphone Tracking, WIRED
(Mar.
3,
2014,
9:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/03/stingray/
[https://perma.cc/RV`6L-QXT8].
192. See Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1194 (“Manipulating our phones for the purpose of
identifying and tracking our personal location presents an even greater intrusion [than
Carpenter].”).
193. MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XIV.
194. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1195.
195. Id.
196. Commonwealth
v.
Almonor,
ACLU
MASS.,
https://www.aclum.org/en/cases/commonwealth-v-almonor
[https://perma.cc/ED4F-LJZ9] (last visited Aug. 18, 2020).
197. Massachusetts Law About Cell Phone Searches, MASS.GOV (Feb. 21, 2020) (alteration
in original) (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018)),
https://www.mass.gov/info-details/massachusetts-law-about-cell-phone-searches
[https://perma.cc/TVR7-YF7W].
198. See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008) (discussing the importance of state
constitutions as bulwarks against state abuse and the source of protections of individual
rights).
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iii. Maine Supreme Judicial Court
In Maine v. O’Donnell, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court stayed the
appeal pending the Supreme Court’s Carpenter decision.199 At issue was
whether law enforcement’s warrantless real-time CSLI search was
considered reasonable.200
Law enforcement compelled Verizon,
O’Donnell’s service provider, to provide the real-time location of his and
his girlfriend’s cell phones.201 Law enforcement submitted an “emergency
disclosure form” to Verizon compelling such disclosure because the
suspects were considered a flight risk.202 Both individuals were quickly
apprehended, and the stolen goods recovered. 203
O’Donnell filed a motion to suppress his CSLI, citing both the Fourth
Amendment and Maine’s Electronic Device Location Information Act.204
The court held that O’Donnell lacked standing to raise a Fourth
Amendment defense because his location was ascertained using his
girlfriend’s CSLI: “[I]t is well-established that Fourth Amendment rights
cannot be asserted vicariously.”205 O’Donnell’s girlfriend chose to serve
as an informant and permitted the warrantless search.206 O’Donnell shows
a state statute providing its citizens with broader freedom from
unreasonable searches than what the U.S. Constitution permits. Maine
requires warrants for both real-time and historical CSLI searches under
its Electronic Device Location Information Act except during exigent
circumstances.207 Maine is 1 of 18 states that currently have some
warrant requirement for CSLI searches.208

199. See Maine v. O’Donnell, 210 A.3d 815, 819 (Me. 2019); see also ACLU Weighs in on
Maine Cell Phone Tracking Case Following U.S. Supreme Court Victory, ACLU (Aug. 30,
2018)
[hereinafter
ACLU
Weighs
In],
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-weighs-maine-cell-phone-tracking-case-followin
g-us-supreme-court-victory [https://perma.cc/9JXT-XU2Y].
200. See O’Donnell, 210 A.3d at 817.
201. See id. at 818.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 819.
204. See id. at 820; ACLU Weighs In, supra note 199.
205. O’Donnell, 210 A.3d at 820–21 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34
(1978)).
206. See id. at 820.
207. See ME. STAT. tit. 16 §§ 648, 650(4) (2019); Brief for American Civil Liberties Union
of Maine et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 36, Maine v. O’Donnell, 210 A.3d
815 (Me. 2019) (No. Fra-17-12).
208. Peter Cihon, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, ACLU (Aug.
26,
2015),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-location-privacy-legislation-states-2015
[https://perma.cc/ZL5P-JW9M]. These states are California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.

2020]

DOES CARPENTER PUT A NAIL IN

1503

iv. New York County Supreme Court
The New York County Supreme Court heard a motion to vacate a
conviction based on real-time and historical CSLI post-Carpenter in People
v. Cutts.209 Aljulah Cutts argued that his conviction relied upon CSLI and
should be retroactively overturned post-Carpenter. 210 The court order law
enforcement obtained was supported by probable cause.211 This order
authorized “the installation and use of a pen register and a trap device,
including caller identification and cell site information, and indicated that
‘[p]robable cause has been established to show that GPS/precision
location is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.’”212 New York’s
probable cause requirement for location information exemplifies
federalism in action by going beyond the Fourth Amendment’s minimum
safeguards.213
New York’s heightened probable cause requirement demands a higher
showing from law enforcement than the federal SCA’s “reasonable
grounds to believe” threshold. States are free to “apply state
constitutional provisions [that are] more protective of freedom than their
federal counterparts.”214 In other words, they may require a probable
cause showing for real-time CSLI searches, even where the federal
protections are less. States need not “stay tuned”215 for the United States
Supreme Court to expand on Carpenter before providing their citizens
with additional protection from unreasonable searches.
v. Queens County Supreme Court
In People v. Simpson,216 New York’s Queens County Supreme Court
had to apply Carpenter during an ongoing trial because the decision came
out just two days after historical CSLI was admitted into evidence.217
This court had held, prior to Carpenter, that “an individual does not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in his/her CSLI.”218 The Government
in Simpson presented an expert witness from T-Mobile to testify that

209. 88 N.Y.S.3d 332 (Sup. Ct. 2018).
210. See id. at 334.
211. See id. at 335.
212. Id. at 335–36.
213. See, e.g., In re Dist. Att’y v. Angelo G., 371 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1975).
214. State Constitutions: Freedom’s Frontier, CATO POL’Y REP. 9, 9 (Nov.–Dec. 2016),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/policy-report/2016/12/cpr-v38n6-4.p
df [https://perma.cc/3Q66-87ZZ].
215. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2267 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
216. 88 N.Y.S.3d 763 (Sup. Ct. 2018).
217. See id. at 766.
218. Id. at 773–74.
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Maurice Simpson’s phone “pinged” a cell tower within minutes of a
nearby robbery, and that Simpson’s historical CSLI suggested that he
was not ordinarily in that area.219 Carpenter forced the court to revisit its
previous decision to admit the defendant’s historical CSLI into
evidence.220 The court explained that in New York, “[f]undamental to
the issuance of any search warrant is a finding by a neutral and detached
magistrate that probable cause exists.”221
Simpson underscores the confusion that lower courts will continue to
face until the Supreme Court makes definitive rulings over different
warrantless CSLI searches. In this case, only three days of historical CSLI
was admitted into evidence.222 The Supreme Court in Carpenter only
definitively held that searching seven days or more of historical CSLI
requires a probable cause warrant.223 Thus, the Government argued that
Carpenter is inapplicable to searches of less than seven days.224 This
argument is inconsistent with Carpenter, however, as the Supreme Court
expressly left that issue unanswered:
[W]e need not decide whether there is a limited period for which the
Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be.
It is sufficient . . . to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes
a Fourth Amendment search.225

Until a definitive federal action is taken, future courts will continue to
have to rule on whether accessing less than seven days of historical CSLI
requires a warrant under the Constitution— either the Supreme Court
takes on a CSLI case and clarifies, or the legislature passes legislation
recognizing CSLI as property.226
vi. States Are Acting Independently to Add to Carpenter
The above cases show state legislatures implementing safeguards to
protect individual location records held by third-party service providers.
Furthermore, they show state courts expanding traditional Fourth

219. See id. at 770.
220. See id. at 771.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 766.
223. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
224. Simpson, N.Y.S.3d at 767.
225. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
226. See Megan Graham, The Fourth Amendment and Third Party Doctrine After
Carpenter
10
(Feb.
2,
2019),
https://nj.fd.org/sites/nj.fd.org/files/cja-seminar-materials/2019/Post-Carpenter-Litigatio
n-Outline.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4WD-CHJY].
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Amendment protection by requiring a warrant for real-time CSLI
collection. Justice Gorsuch remarked that the Fourth Amendment means
more than “protecting only the specific rights known at the founding; it
means protecting their modern analogues too.”227 An individual’s CSLI
held by third parties may, in fact, enjoy the same protection as
traditionally protected categories. “[I]f state legislators or state courts
say that a digital record has the attributes that normally make something
property, that may supply a sounder basis for judicial decisionmaking
than judicial guesswork about societal expectations.”228 Put another
way, states may order that obtaining real-time CSLI also requires a
warrant, notwithstanding Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test
and the Third Party Doctrine. As Justice Gorsuch analogized,
“[w]hatever may be left of [the Third Party Doctrine], few doubt that
e-mail should be treated much like the traditional mail it has largely
supplanted.”229 State legislatures and courts have largely forbidden
warrantless searches of an individual’s real-time location.230 In so doing,
they made a laudable societal judgment that the expectation of privacy
over CSLI requires a warrant. This is a decision that the federal
government is still unprepared to take.
B. Supreme Deference: Lower Courts Avoiding or Declining to Extend
Carpenter
The cases below represent how other courts are limiting or otherwise
avoiding warrantless real-time CSLI searches post-Carpenter. This
judicial response can be attributed to (1) Carpenter’s narrow applicability
and silence regarding real-time CSLI and (2) societal expectations
regarding when warrantless law enforcement CSLI searches are
appropriate under the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard.
i. United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
In United States v. Saemisch, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts declared that “if law enforcement is confronted
with an urgent situation, such fact-specific threats will likely justify the
warrantless collection of CSLI.”231 The court noted Carpenter’s silence

227. GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 164.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 163.
230. See generally supra Section II.A.
231. United States v. Saemsich, 371 F. Supp. 3d 37, 42 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)).
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regarding the constitutionality of real-time CSLI searches,232 but
reiterated the Court’s stance that “even though the Government will
generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific exceptions may
support a warrantless search of an individual’s cell-site records under
certain circumstances.”233 One such exception occurs when law
enforcement face an exigent circumstance.234
In this case, an informant alerted law enforcement that Christopher
Saemisch had access to children and planned to have “sexual
relationships” with them.235 An undercover investigation led to
Saemisch, confirming his plans.236 However, when law enforcement
arrived at his home the next day, Saemish was gone.237 Homeland
Security located Saemisch by ordering AT&T to warrantlessly “ping” his
cell phone.238 The SCA permits service providers to divulge CSLI to
government agencies without an order where it “in good faith, believes
that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to
any person requires disclosure without delay.”239 The court found this
warrantless search to be reasonable because “there were exigent
circumstances that supported an objectively reasonable belief that the
defendant posed a potentially imminent threat to the safety of identified
minor children.”240 The Massachusetts federal court ruled on the Fourth
Amendment’s exigent circumstances exception241 instead of more broadly
addressing the constitutionality of warrantless real-time CSLI searches
post-Carpenter.242 Saemisch illustrates how warrantless real-time CSLI
searches can provide a communal benefit by giving law enforcement the
capability to mitigate an exigent threat quickly.
The Fourth
Amendment’s exigent circumstances exception balances the individual’s
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures on the one hand,
and critical law enforcement and national security needs on the other.243

232. See id. at 42.
233. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018).
234. See Saemisch, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 42.
235. See id. at 39.
236. See id. at 40.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4); see also Saemisch, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
240. Saemisch, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 42.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. Michelle Perin, Technology after Carpenter, OFFICER.COM (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.officer.com/command-hq/technology/article/21017662/what-does-carpentermean-for-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/5QJ5-2NSN].
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ii. Supreme Court of Florida
The Supreme Court of Florida, Florida’s highest court, found Carpenter
inapplicable where law enforcement searched an individual’s real-time
location with a portable “cell-site simulator.”244 A cell-site simulator, also
known as “Sting Ray” or “IMSI Catcher,” is a moveable device originally
designed for military and intelligence communities that “simulates a
cellphone tower in order to trick nearby mobile devices into connecting to
it and revealing their location.”245 Its portability allows the government
to triangulate a suspect’s location with much greater accuracy than the
fixed cell towers searched in Carpenter.246 This technology is controversial
today because it “collaterally gather[s] data from innocent bystanders’
phones and can interrupt phone users’ service — which critics say violates
a federal communications law.”247 Nevertheless, law enforcement
agencies use cell-site simulators throughout the country in unknown
numbers.248
In Andres v. State, law enforcement used a cell-site simulator to execute
a probable cause warrant.249 The warrant covered Rafael Andres’s DNA
and photographs of his body, but not his physical location.250 The court
denied Andres’s motion to suppress the CSLI evidence acquired from the
cell-site simulator because law enforcement procured a valid warrant in
good faith.251 The court also declined to extend Carpenter’s warrant
requirement to real-time CSLI:
We take notice of the United States Supreme Court’s recently issued
decision in Carpenter v. United States . . . . However, we conclude that
its holding is not applicable to this case, where officers used real-time
cell-site location information to locate Andres for the purposes of
executing the warrant.252

244. Andres v. State, 254 So. 3d 283, 298 n.7 (Fla. 2018).
245. Zetter, supra note 191.
246. Id.
247. Ryan Gallagher, FBI Documents Shine Light on Clandestine Cellphone Tracking
(Jan.
10,
2013,
2:14
PM),
Tool,
SLATE
https://slate.com/technology/2013/01/stingray-imsi-catcher-fbi-documents-shine-light-on
-controversial-cellphone-tracking-tool.html [https://perma.cc/X97F-LHTV]; see also
Yomna Nasser, Gotta Catch ‘Em All: Understanding How IMSI-Catchers Exploit Cell
Networks,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(June
28,
2019),
https://www.eff.org/wp/gotta-catch-em-all-understanding-how-imsi-catchers-exploit-cell
-networks [https://perma.cc/FRR9-DWSQ].
248. Gallagher, supra note 247.
249. Andres, 254 So. 3d, at 298.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Id. at 297 n.7.
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Andres emphasized Carpenter’s narrow applicability.253 The Supreme
Court of Florida recognized that Carpenter only definitively ruled on
historical CSLI searches and declined to extend such warrant protection
to real-time CSLI searches.254 This illustrates a measure of judicial
restraint, which harkens back to the Warren Supreme Court’s push in
“both deferring to the people and allowing Congress wide latitude to pass
legislation that best protected [people in the United States’] rights.”255
The Warren Court believed that “[b]y definition repeat losers in the
majoritarian political process, discrete and insular minorities only achieve
victories in that process with intense effort and years of activism. Their
successful struggle to obtain legislation that protects their rights deserves
respect from the courts in the form of deference to that legislation.”256
Judges may be ill-equipped to make societal decisions intended for the
legislature. “Politically insulated judges come armed with only the
attorney’s briefs, a few law clerks, and their own idiosyncratic
experiences. They are hardly the representative group you’d expect (or
want) to be making empirical judgments for hundreds of millions of
people” because they often “fail to reflect public views.”257 The Supreme
Court of Florida’s nonfeasance here gives deference to state and federal
legislative enactments, as well as respect for the governmental separation
of powers, because the legislature represents the people’s perspectives
about reasonable warrantless searches.
iii. Court of Appeals of Indiana
Indiana’s intermediate Court of Appeals permitted a real-time CSLI
search under the Fourth Amendment’s exigent circumstances exception
in Govan v. State of Indiana.258 Here, law enforcement interviewed a
woman, seriously injured allegedly by Morgan Govan, in a hospital.259
The victim’s mother provided investigators with Govan’s cell phone
number.260 Obtaining the phone number allowed law enforcement to
contact Sprint, the suspect’s service provider, and ask them to provide

253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Sandhya Bathija, Why Judicial Restraint Best Protects Our Rights, CATO
(Feb.
7,
2014),
UNBOUND
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/02/07/sandhya-bathija/why-judicial-restraint-bestprotects-our-rights#_ftnref5 [https://perma.cc/B4XS-LGDZ].
256. Rebecca A. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why it
Matters), OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 260 (2007).
257. GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 157.
258. 116 N.E.3d 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
259. See id. at 1169.
260. See id.
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“emergency or exigent ping[s]” to ascertain Govan’s real-time CSLI.261
Law enforcement’s supporting affidavit to Sprint stated that Govan
“restrain[ed] [two women] in his basement and brutally beat[] them for
forty-five minutes,” that one victim’s mother provided Govan’s phone
number to investigators at the hospital, and that “Govan knew where
they lived . . . [and] had tried to contact [the victims] via Facebook . . .
at the hospital.”262 Sprint complied, and law enforcement apprehended
the defendant within two hours.263 Govan later filed a motion to suppress
this real-time CSLI evidence under both the Indiana and federal
constitutions.264
The court noted that Carpenter declined to rule on the constitutionality
of warrantless real-time CSLI searches,265 but ruled that law
enforcement’s “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or
threatened with such injury” met the Fourth Amendment’s exigent
circumstance exception.266 Additionally, this service provider’s internal
procedures also provided a secondary layer of protection from arbitrary
warrantless searches: “Sprint makes an independent determination about
whether the situation is exigent and does not merely rubber-stamp a
police officer’s request.”267 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
denial of Govan’s motion to suppress the warrantless real-time CSLI
search.268 This case provides another example of an instance where law
enforcement can warrantlessly search real-time CSLI under the Fourth
Amendment’s exigent circumstance exception, regardless of Carpenter’s
narrow applicability.269
The Supreme Court has set forth instances where exigent
circumstances make warrantless searches objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.270 Such instances include officers providing
emergency aid271 and hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.272 Courts have held

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1173.
See id. at 1170.
See id.
See id. at 1172.
Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
Id. at 1173.
See id. at 1178.
See id. at 1172.
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976).
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that when such situations arise, society has “objectively” determined that
warrantless searches are reasonable during an emergency.273
The various approaches from lower courts on warrantless CSLI
searches indicate that an individual’s protection against such searches
depends largely upon which state they are being investigated in.
Carpenter’s equivocal treatment of real-time CSLI furthers this dilemma.
Lower courts lack the power to seriously call into question the Third
Party Doctrine and Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test as it
relates to warrantless searches of an individual’s location.274 On the other
hand, the Supreme Court can extend Carpenter’s national protection to
both real-time CSLI searches and historical CSLI searches of less than
seven days.275 In doing so, the Court can ensure that every person in the
United States is protected against unreasonable warrantless location
searches. Today, only some people in the United States enjoy this right.
Resolving questions post-Carpenter, like which warrantless CSLI searches
comport with the Fourth Amendment, must balance society’s
expectation about reasonable warrantless searches and the need for
efficient law enforcement investigations. What follows are possible
solutions that may be taken to address Carpenter’s ambiguity.
III. PROGRESSIVE FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTING JUSTICE GORSUCH’S
PROPERTY-BASED APPROACH TO PROTECT ALL CSLI
Justice Breyer remarked that warrantless CSLI searches are “an open
box. We know not where we go.”276 This Section reviews how the
Carpenter Court’s majority and dissents may address real-time CSLI
searches and CSLI searches of less than seven days. Part III concludes
by advocating for Justice Gorsuch’s property-based approach to protect
all CSLI at the federal level and encourages states to safeguard their own
citizens’ rights in the meantime. Part II exemplified how Carpenter’s
narrow holding falls short in rectifying the existing gap between (1)
historical CSLI searches of one week or more that require a warrant
post-Carpenter, and (2) real-time CSLI searches and historical CSLI

273. See, e.g., Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400 (holding that the emergency-aid exception
to the warrant requirement allows warrantless home searches where police have an
“objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or
imminently threatened with such injury”); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
299–300 (1999) (discussing the balancing act between the government interest, as
represented by society, and the individual right to privacy when determining exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment).
274. See GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 165.
275. See id.
276. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 34.
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searches of less than one week, which the Carpenter court declined to rule
on. There is currently a judicial split over whether this second category
requires a warrant.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is divided over whether other
warrantless CSLI searches should be governed under Katz’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy test, the Third Party Doctrine’s reasonable
grounds to believe standard, or as “property” under the Fourth
Amendment. For this reason, state legislatures and courts should adopt
the measures taken by states like Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, and
New York to protect all of their citizens’ CSLI. A movement like this can
influence the Supreme Court, which has historically changed positions
based upon societal trends and changes in state laws.277
A. The Katz Is Out of the Bag: Judges Are Ill-Equipped to Measure
Societal Expectations of Privacy
The Carpenter majority found that law enforcement’s warrantless CSLI
search violated Carpenter’s “legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of his physical movements” under Katz.278 The Court recognized
that individuals “compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time.
A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and
into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other
potentially revealing locales.”279 Accordingly, it extended traditional
Fourth Amendment property protection to Carpenter’s CSLI.280 As a
result, law enforcement needs a warrant to search historical CSLI of one
week or more. It remains to be seen how the Court will treat warrantless
real-time CSLI searches and historical CSLI searches lasting less than one
week, however.281

277. Judicial Decision-Making and Implementation by the Supreme Court, ST. UNIV.
N.Y.,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-amgovernment/chapter/judicial-decision-makin
g-and-implementation-by-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/X6A2-C5PP] (“In the
1960s, sodomy was banned in all the states. By 1986, that number had been reduced by
about half. By 2002, thirty-six states had repealed their sodomy laws, and most states
were only selectively enforcing them. Changes in state laws, along with an emerging LGBT
movement, no doubt swayed the Court and led it to the reversal of its earlier ruling with
the 2003 decision, Lawrence v. Texas.”).
278. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
279. Id. at 2218.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on
matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of information on all
the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval). We do not
disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance
techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business records
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According to Justice Gorsuch, Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy
test is inconsistent with both the Constitution’s text and intent because
it shoehorned “privacy” into the Fourth Amendment.282 Justice Gorsuch
stated that “[t]he framers chose not to protect privacy in some ethereal
way dependent on judicial intuitions. They chose instead to protect
privacy in particular places and things — ‘persons, houses, papers, and
effects’ — and against particular threats — ‘unreasonable’ governmental
‘searches and seizures.’”283 Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy
standard has replaced the framers’ objective thoughts on unreasonable
searches with judicial discretion and flexibility.284 However, such
“judicial judgments often fail to reflect public views.”285 Indeed, the
judiciary is “hardly the representative group you’d expect (or want) to be
making empirical [or normative] judgments for hundreds of millions of
people.”286 That is a role best left up to Congress. Thus, Justice Gorsuch
argues that Katz’s ongoing problem is that it substitutes the legislature’s
majoritarian perspective on reasonable warrantless law enforcement
searches with a judge’s so-called subjective “judicial imagination.”287
B. Big Brother Is Watching: The Third Party Doctrine Gives Law
Enforcement Carte Blanche to Warrantlessly Search an Individual’s
Location
In Carpenter, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
dissented on the grounds that CSLI should be treated as an ordinary
business record under the Third Party Doctrine.288 The Third Party
Doctrine is an extension of Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy
test,289 and would permit real warrantless real-time CSLI searches and
searches of less than a week because there is no protection in CSLI
controlled by service providers.290 In other words, turning over business
that might incidentally reveal location information. Further, our opinion does not
consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.”).
282. See GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 157; supra Sections I.A.iii.b–d.
283. See GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 157.
284. See id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 156; supra Section I.A.ii.1.
288. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
289. See GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 156.
290. See id.
Another justification sometimes offered for third party doctrine is clarity. You
(and the police) know exactly how much protection you have in information
confided to others: none. As rules go, “the king always wins” is admirably clear.
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records to a third party negates any “expectation of privacy” in those
records.291 One benefit from this bright-line rule is that the judiciary
defers to the democratically accountable legislature when deciding what
society would deem reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.292
Congress is in a better position to gauge societal reasonableness as
democratically-elected public servants.293 Thus, the SCA’s Section
2703(d) order, which requires “reasonable grounds to believe” instead of
“probable cause,” would constitutionally permit warrantless real-time
CSLI searches and searches of less than a week under the Third Party
Doctrine.
The Supreme Court established the Third Party Doctrine long before
society’s “seismic shift” into the digital age.294 This is why today, most
legal commentators believe “the Third Party Doctrine is not only wrong,
but horribly wrong.”295 Warrantless digital location surveillance is
markedly different from the bank records and phone numbers that the
Supreme Court permitted law enforcement to warrantlessly search in
Smith and Miller.296 “It is a Fourth Amendment fiction that individuals
‘voluntarily’ convey CSLI [pursuant to the Third Party Doctrine] as one
would dial a phone number. Users do not intentionally create CSLI and
have no real choice in the matter.”297 Still, under the Third Party
Doctrine, the 95% of cell phone owners risk law enforcement
warrantlessly searching their location under a lower standard than the
Fourth Amendment requires.298 Adding to this problem is that many
Americans are unaware that service providers even collect and store their

But the opposite rule would be clear too: Third party disclosures never diminish
Fourth Amendment protection (call it “the king always loses”).
Id.
291. See supra Section I.B.ii.
292. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 2219.
295. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564
(2009); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.7(C) (5th ed. 2019) (“The result reached in Miller is dead wrong, and the
Court’s woefully inadequate reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth
Amendment protection the Court had developed in Katz.”).
296. See supra Section I.B.ii.
297. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 20–21, Carpenter v. United States., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402).
298. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (“[C]ell phones and the services they provide are
‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to
participation in modern society.”); see also ACLU Weighs In, supra note 199.
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every movement.299 So “[i]n the end, what do Smith and Miller add up
to? A doubtful application of Katz that lets the government search
almost whatever it wants whenever it wants.”300
Both Katz and the Third Party Doctrine are suboptimal approaches to
resolve warrantless CSLI searches post-Carpenter. These approaches fail
to resolve the profoundly impactful issues surrounding warrantless police
searches of an individual’s real-time CSLI and CSLI of less than seven
days. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures demands more than that.301 But there is another
option.
C. Throw the Baby Out with the Bathwater: Protect CSLI through Fourth
Amendment “Property” Categorization
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable
warrantless law enforcement searches regardless of the era they live in.
Although the Framers had no concept of CSLI in 1789, they internalized
an innate appreciation of property rights in early America from English
common law.302 In Entick v. Carrington,303 for example, England’s King’s
Bench created significant restrictions on the scope of executive power.304
This judicial check on governmental authority was highly praised in
America and inspired the Fourth Amendment.305 In Entick, a case widely
recognized as “a heralded decision that the founding generation
considered ‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law,’ . . .
Lord Camden explained that ‘[t]he great end, for which men entered into
society, was to secure their property.’”306 This property-based approach
to unreasonable searches may be extended to CSLI and thus better
protects against warrantless CSLI searches than Carpenter, Katz, and the
Third Party Doctrine.

299. See Rob Pegoraro, Apple and Google Remind You About Location Privacy, but Don’t
Forget Your Wireless Carrier, USA TODAY (Nov. 23, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2019/11/23/location-data-how-much-do
-wireless-carriers-keep/4257759002/ [https://perma.cc/ANC2-8Z6Z].
300. See GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 156.
301. See id. at 153.
302. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (noting that the Framers’ priority regarding the Fourth
Amendment was “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance”).
303. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (K.B. 1765).
304. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259,
283 (2009).
305. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886)).
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Indeed, Justice Gorsuch’s Carpenter dissent urged future defendants to
employ this property-based argument the next time law enforcement
warrantlessly searches an individual’s digital location.307 This defense
classifies third-party service providers as “bailees”308 who owe a legal
duty to the individual to secure their location information.309 Justice
Gorsuch made the apt comparison: “Ever . . . [a]sk your neighbor to look
after your dog while you travel? You would not expect . . . the neighbor
to put Fido up for adoption.”310 It is important to note that CSLI is not
wholly analogous to a dog, but, in any case, recent Supreme Court
decisions have implied that “the use of technology is functionally
compelled by the demands of modern life, and in that way the fact that
we store data with third parties may amount to a sort of involuntary
bailment too.”311 It is high time for the federal government to recognize
that its decisions from the 1970s and telecommunication regulations from
the 1980s are ill-equipped to govern warrantless law enforcement CSLI
searches in 2020. States and lower courts can provide the catalyst for this
societal change in much the same way that the LGBT movement
influenced the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, a monumental
decision that made anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional throughout
America.312 Classifying CSLI as property under the Fourth Amendment
would best protect individuals from warrantless historical and real-time
CSLI searches.
CONCLUSION
Carpenter took the next step of preventing seemingly Orwellian levels
of warrantless law enforcement surveillance, but the battle for digital
privacy rages on.313 Legal commentators Albert Fox Cahn and Karin

307. See id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Litigants have had fair notice since at
least United States v. Jones (2012) and Florida v. Jardines (2013) that arguments like these
may vindicate Fourth Amendment interests even where Katz arguments do not. Yet the
arguments have gone unmade, leaving courts to the usual Katz handwaving. These
omissions do not serve the development of a sound or fully protective Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”).
308. Id. at 2268.
309. An Introduction to Bailee Liability Concepts, INLAND MARINE UNDERWRITERS
ASS’N:
BAILEES
&
PROCESSORS
COMM.
(1994),
https://www.imua.org/Files/reports/An%20Introduction%20to%20Bailee%20Liability
%20Concepts.html [https://perma.cc/39CB-CASG].
310. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
311. See GORSUCH, supra note 168, at 163.
312. See Judicial Decision-Making and Implementation by the Supreme Court, supra note
277.
313. Albert Fox Cahn & Karin Bashir, Carpenter Ruling Brings Us Back from Brink of
Orwellian
Surveillance
State,
JUST
SEC.
(June
28,
2018),
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Bashir note that “[a]s the law struggles to keep pace with the growth of
cheap, powerful, and prolific tracking tools, Carpenter marks a crucial step
away from formalistic privacy analysis that hobbled prior Fourth
Amendment cases.”314 Currently, Carpenter’s equivocal position on
real-time CSLI searches and historical CSLI searches of less than seven
days inhibits lower courts from providing congruent holdings as to the
constitutionality of warrantless CSLI searches. Federally, all that the
Supreme Court made certain post-Carpenter is that searching seven or
more days of CSLI requires a warrant.315 As for everything else, America
must “stay tuned.”316 The judiciary and legislature should clearly
demarcate which warrantless CSLI searches infringe upon the
individual’s Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. As stated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, “[o]ne key
way courts put this into practice is by creating bright-line rules that signal
to the police and citizens alike what is covered by the warrant
requirement.”317
The Supreme Court and Congress’s nonfeasance today should also
motivate states to develop their own safeguards against warrantless CSLI
searches. Thomas Jefferson once stated that “free people claim[] their
rights, as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief
magistrate.”318
Stanford Professor Steven Callander posits that
implementing a “states as laboratories” approach to CSLI laws
exemplifies
“progressive federalism,” in which the national government orchestrates
a “sort-of tournament” between states to find the best solution to a
problem. The state that comes up with the “winning’ approach” — the
policy showing the best outcomes — gets to keep it, while the other
states must adopt that winning policy . . . .319

Even post-Carpenter, states can act independently to require a warrant
for all law enforcement CSLI searches. A number of states are actively
working to classify various digital and electronic mediums as

https://www.justsecurity.org/58607/carpenter-ruling-brings-brink-orwellian-surveillancestate/ [https://perma.cc/64T9-9B2L].
314. Id.
315. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
316. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
317. Andrew Crocker, Massachusetts Court Rules Cell Tracking Requires a Warrant,
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Sept.
28,
2015),
ELEC.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/09/massachusetts-court-rules-cell-tracking-requireswarrant [https://perma.cc/7X2F-RXWH].
318. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA 22
(1774).
319. Andrews, supra note 187.
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“property.”320 Should this trend continue, the “winning” approach may
become the next defense against warrantless CSLI searches.

320. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(12) (West 2017) (defining “property”
to include “property held in any digital or electronic medium”); Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
84 N.E.3d 766, 768 (2017) (e-mail account is a “form of property often referred to as a
‘digital asset’”); Eysoldt v. ProScan Imaging, 957 N.E.2d 780, 786 (2011) (permitting
action for conversion of web account as “intangible property”).

